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Reform the EEOC Guidelines: Protect Employees 
from Gender Discrimination as Mandated by Title VII 
Jennifer D. Growe∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII” or 
“the Act”)1 expressly prohibits sex discrimination in employment, the 
courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC),2 empowered with enforcing Title VII, have promulgated 
different standards for sexual harassment and sex discrimination.3 
This phenomenon has had the effect of leaving a class of individuals 
in the untenable position of suffering discrimination in the workplace 
because of their sex,4 yet unable to avail themselves of Title VII 
protection. The following hypothetical best exhibits this disconnect in 
the law.  
Plaintiff, Ann, was an assistant professor of biochemistry at a 
prestigious private university (“University”).5 She initially viewed 
the position as a stepping stone toward a fully tenured position. 
However, she quickly realized that as the only female in the 
department, she faced a rocky road to success. Within the first month 
 
 ∗ J.D. (2007), Washington University School of Law; B.A.-Political Science with high 
distinction (2004), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).  
 2. See infra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.  
 3. See L. Camille Hébert, Sexual Harassment Is Gender Harassment, 43 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 565 (1995) (comparing sex discrimination, with regard to gender stereotyping that 
disadvantages an employee or group of employees because of their sex; with sexual harassment, 
with regard to unwanted sexual advances or verbal abuse directed toward a female employee in 
order to fulfill the male perpetrator’s sexual desires and to subordinate the role of the female in 
the workplace).  
 4. For purposes this Note, the terms “sex” and “gender” are used interchangeably to 
describe the biological and social identities of men and women.  
 5. This hypothetical is based on the facts in King v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Wisconsin System, 898 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1990).  
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of Ann’s employment, the assistant dean, Bob, began making 
sexually suggestive comments to her. As the semester progressed, 
Bob’s comments became more explicit, and he often inappropriately 
rubbed up against her. His increasingly offensive behavior 
culminated with him following Ann into the restroom during a 
department social event where he forcibly kissed and fondled her, 
telling her that he “had to have her.” Ann refused and quickly 
extricated herself from the situation. The next morning, she reported 
Bob’s conduct to the University administrators, who began an 
investigation into the incident.  
Deeply troubled by Bob’s conduct, Ann sought the advice of an 
attorney to better understand her rights. At their first meeting, Ann 
described Bob’s sexually explicit comments and actions, and she 
informed the attorney of the University’s investigation.  
She also confided that, although embarrassed and disgusted by 
Bob’s behavior, she was most distressed by the more veiled conduct 
of the chairman of the department, Charles. Even though his actions 
were not of a sexual nature, Ann told her attorney that Charles had 
created a situation in which she could not succeed, thus making it 
almost impossible for her to meet the University’s tenure 
requirements. For example, he assigned her a heavier workload than 
the male members of the department, and he insisted that she perform 
time-consuming menial tasks unrelated to her teaching 
responsibilities.  
Charles also subjected Ann to an inordinate number of teaching 
evaluations followed by poor appraisals, and he publicly embarrassed 
her in faculty meetings. Ann truly believed that between Bob’s 
sexually overt behavior and Charles’ extraordinary demands, she 
worked in a hostile environment.6 
The attorney advised Ann that she should file two Title VII claims 
against the University: one alleging hostile work environment sexual 
harassment based on Bob’s blatant sexually based conduct, and 
another alleging a hostile work environment based on her sex.7 
 
 6. See infra note 31 and accompanying text (describing the judicially created Title VII 
“hostile work environment” claim). 
 7. See Marren Roy, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: A Search for Standards 
in the Wake of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 48 SMU L. REV. 263, 279 (1994). 
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However, the attorney warned her that she should be prepared for 
success only on the sexual harassment claim. In other words, even 
though Ann had a deeper concern about the impact of Charles’ 
actions on her ability to succeed in her job and attain her career goals, 
the legal system would be more apt to provide relief only for her 
endurance of sexual advances and would be reluctant to provide a 
remedy for her male superior’s creation of roadblocks to her success 
on account of her being a female in an otherwise all-male department. 
This was true even though both Bob and Charles were motivated by 
the same purpose: to negate Ann’s “right to participate in the 
workplace on an equal footing.”8 
Dilemmas like Ann’s have become increasingly prevalent as 
women make up a greater percentage of all sectors of the workforce, 
leading to claims which reveal “cracks in the [sex discrimination] 
doctrine . . . that are in great need of repair.”9 Sexually based 
workplace behavior, especially a male supervisor’s advances on a 
less powerful female worker, has become the prototypical form of 
sexual harassment giving rise to hostile work environment claims.10 
Yet, this trend fails to recognize that the most common form of 
discrimination women face in the workplace is not sexually based, 
but rather sex-based: forms of harassment designed to preserve a 
male hierarchy in the workplace. As noted by several legal scholars, 
 
  To establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment under the hostile [work] 
environment theory, a plaintiff must show five things: (1) that she belongs to a 
protected group; (2) that she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the 
harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment affected some term or condition 
or privilege of employment; and, if appropriate, (5) some ground to hold the employer 
liable. 
Id. 
 8. King, 898 F.2d at 537 (quoting Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213 (7th 
Cir. 1986)).  
 9. Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 
692 (1997) (discussing the conflation of sex discrimination and sexual harassment still existing 
years after the EEOC and the Supreme Court first embraced the notion of sexual harassment as 
a form of Title VII sex discrimination).  
 10. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1692 
(1998). “The quintessential case of harassment involves a more powerful, typically older, male 
supervisor, who uses his superior organizational position to demand sexual favors from a less 
powerful . . . female subordinate.” Id.  
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even though Title VII protects hostile workplace sexual harassment,11 
courts have created a doctrine narrowing the law’s protection such 
that sexual harassment claims have been relegated to a mere legal 
recourse for the discomfort resulting from egregious sex-based 
conduct at work. Yet it is just as common for a woman to be the 
object of forms of harassment which are devoid of sexuality, but 
which still “undermine [her] perceived . . . competence to do work.”12 
Unfortunately, there is scant recognition of this type of sex 
discrimination in the law, leaving women with little legal recourse if 
a man engages in behavior deflating her professional capacity 
because of her gender. 
According to the theory developed herein, the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of the “hostile work environment” doctrine has failed to 
provide a clear and unambiguous standard for analyzing a sex 
discrimination claim under Title VII that is based on non-sexualized 
gender discrimination.13 As a result, our legal system and scholars 
have spent more than two decades struggling to decipher what is and 
what is not a “hostile work environment” created by sexual 
harassment based on overt sexuality. At the same time, failure to 
create meaningful remedies for this pervasive type of sex harassment 
reinforces gender norms and preserves male-dominated authority in 
the workplace, otherwise known as gender discrimination.  
This Note considers the growing disconnect in sex discrimination 
law in light of the fact that the EEOC and the Supreme Court have 
collectively excluded gender discrimination from legal remedy. First, 
this Note traces the jurisprudence of the sexual harassment doctrine 
and how the framework of hostile work environment claims provide 
victims of sexually offensive workplaces meaningful remedy under 
Title VII, while simultaneously excluding victims of sex 
discrimination from protection. Next, this Note examines previous 
scholarship recounting the limitations of the hostile work 
 
 11. See generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).  
 12. Schultz, supra note 10, at 1687. 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
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environment as sexual versus sex-based harassment,14 and the effects 
that such limitations have on reinforcing sex stereotypes in 
employment. After analyzing the failure of the EEOC and the federal 
judiciary to respond to this concern, this Note proposes that the 
EEOC reissue its Guidelines on Sex Discrimination in order to 
transform the current interpretation of sex discrimination law and to 
present an avenue by which lower courts can better afford Title VII 
protection to victims of sex discriminatory workplaces.15 This Note 
concludes that by disregarding this apparent shortcoming, courts and 
the EEOC are, in effect, ignoring the Title VII mandate to eradicate 
sex discrimination.  
I. HISTORY 
A. The Origins of Title VII and Anti-Sex Discrimination Legislation 
Title VII, the central piece of employment anti-discrimination 
legislation,16 is premised on the ideology that people must be 
evaluated as “individuals, rather than as a member of a class.”17  
 
 14. Examples of non-sexual, sex-based conduct include calling male employees “men” 
and female employees “girls.” See EEOC Dec. No. 72-0679, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 441, 441–
42 (1971).  
 15. See Franke, supra note 9, at 723. “The words ‘sex’ and ‘sexual’ create definitional 
problems because they can mean either ‘relating to gender’ or ‘relating to sexual/reproductive 
behavior.’” Id. (quoting Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat’l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (N.D. 
Ind. 1995)). 
 16. Interestingly, the statute was initially proposed solely to preclude racial discrimination 
against African American employees; however, Congress drafted a very broad, language-
neutral statute preventing discrimination of several protected classes. See 110 CONG. REC. 2581 
(1964) (“Whether we want to admit it or not, the main purpose of this legislation today is to try 
and help end the discrimination that has been practiced against Negroes.”); Kara L. Gross, 
Note, Toward Gender Equality and Understanding: Recognizing That Same-Sex Sexual 
Harassment Is Sex Discrimination, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1165, 1172 (1996) (explaining that the 
original purpose behind Title VII was protection of African American employees from racial 
discrimination); Deborah N. McFarland, Note, Beyond Sex Discrimination: A Proposal for 
Federal Sexual Harassment Legislation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 498 (1996) (stating that the 
initial purpose behind the enactment of Title VII was prohibition of workplace discrimination of 
African Americans).  
 17. Laura Hoffman Roppé, Case Note, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: Victory or 
Defeat?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 321, 321 (1995). In enacting Title VII, Congress sought to 
preclude the situation in which the employer treats some people less favorably than others 
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Hébert, supra note 3, at 348. 
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Even though the term “sex”18 has been included in Title VII’s 
language since the time it was signed into law, in the decade 
following its enactment, scant attention was paid to offensive sex- or 
gender-related actions in the workplace as legitimate legal claims 
within the realm of illegal employment discrimination.19 Early cases 
seeking Title VII protection for sexually abusive conduct in the 
workplace were rejected on theories that sexual advances were the 
inevitable result of the gender-heterogeneous workplace.20  
 
 18. The word “sex” was added as an amendment by conservatives in an attempt to defeat 
the bill. See Denise Merna, Note, Getting it Straight: The Supreme Court Expands Title VII to 
Protect Against All Forms of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 323, 
325 (1999); see also 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (debating addition of the word “sex”); Amy 
Shahan, Comment, Determining Whether Title VII Provides a Cause of Action for Same-Sex 
Sexual Harassment, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 507, 510 (1996); JUDITH A. BAER, WOMEN IN 
AMERICAN LAW: THE STRUGGLE TOWARD EQUALITY FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE PRESENT 
80 (2d ed. 1996).  
 19. Early claims of Title VII sexual harassment were unsuccessful for female plaintiffs 
seeking to pave the way in asserting their legal rights for relief from sexually abusive work 
environments. In the 1975 case of Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 
1975), female workers brought a claim for workplace sexual harassment alleging verbal and 
sexual harassment by their male supervisor. Id. at 161. Although the Corne court recognized 
that Title VII extends to offensive, discriminatory work environments, the Court found that the 
“sexual advances” alleged in the case reflected nothing more than a “personal urge,” and that 
there could not be a “potential federal lawsuit” under Title VII every time one employee made a 
sexual advance at another. Id. at 163. Similarly, in Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas 
Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev’d and remanded, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977), a 
female employee was subjected to a business lunch during which her employer became 
intoxicated, made several sexual advances at her, and threatened to undermine her job security 
if she attempted to report his behavior. Id. at 555. In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument and 
ruling in favor of the defendant in its motion to dismiss, the court found that “an invitation to 
dinner” cannot be an “invitation to a federal law suit,” and that allowing the plaintiff to triumph 
in the case before the court would stop any superior from opening social dialogue with a 
subordinate, in effect opening the floodgates of litigation. Id. at 557.  
 20. Early cases endorsed the idea that workplace sexual harassment was a simple 
expression of male sexual desires for females, and claims by women alleging sexual harassment 
by male supervisors or co-workers were manifestations of their individual frustrations with their 
situations, rather than legitimate discriminatory grievances. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade in Court, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 145, 148–49 
(Patricia Smith ed., 1993). It was not until 1976 that sexual harassment was recognized as a 
legitimate claim of sexual discrimination under Title VII. See Williams v. Saxby, 413 F. Supp. 
654 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that a Title VII sex discrimination action existed when a male 
supervisor acted in a retaliatory manner against a female employee who had refused his sexual 
advances).  
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B. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Enforcement of 
Title VII in America’s Workplaces 
The role of the EEOC in enforcing Title VII and promulgating 
rules and procedures to enforce the Act was established by Congress 
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21 Since its inception, the EEOC has 
played a central role in the development of what constitutes a viable 
Title VII claim.22 The EEOC has long recognized that sexual 
harassment in the workplace is an unlawful employment practice in 
violation of Title VII.23  
In 1980, to advance its position that sexual harassment is a form 
of sex discrimination covered by Title VII, the EEOC issued 
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex (“EEOC Guidelines”) 
in which it specifically defined sexual harassment.24 The EEOC 
Guidelines established criteria for determining conduct that 
constitutes sexual harassment in the hostile work environment: 
“Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other 
verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature, . . . when submission 
to such conduct is made . . . a term or condition of an individual’s 
employment, . . . or such conduct . . . creat[es] an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive working environment.”25 The EEOC Guidelines, 
 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2000).  
 22. Catherine M. Maraist, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton: An Analysis of the Subjective 
Perception Test Required by Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 57 LA. L. REV. 1343, 1348 n.42 
(1997).  
 23. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM MANUAL; Sex Discrimination Issues (1996) [hereinafter PROGRAM MANUAL]. “It 
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, condition of employment, because of the individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.” Id.  
 24. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980). The Guidelines were adopted and became effective 
upon publication in the Federal Register on November 10, 1980. Id. As set forth in its reference 
literature, the EEOC analyzes the totality of the circumstances of the claim, such as the nature 
of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred. Id. 
§ 1604.11(b). 
 25. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11a (1991). The EEOC has further developed a variety of 
circumstances in which sexual harassment can occur,  
including but not limited to the following: [1] The victim as well as the harasser may 
be a woman or man. The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex. [2] The 
harasser can be the victim’s supervisor, an agent of the employer, a supervisor in 
another area, a co-worker, or a non-employee. [3] The victim does not have to be the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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however, failed to offer a definition of the type of discriminatory 
employer activity relating to hostile and denigrating non-sexual 
conduct motivated by gender-constituted sex discrimination under 
Title VII.26  
C. The Supreme Court on Sex: The Birth of the “Hostile Work 
Environment” 
1. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 
In 1986, in the landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson,27 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a 
sexually aggressive hostile work environment is a form of sexual 
discrimination.28 In considering whether the alleged harassment was 
actionable, the Court recognized Title VII as a vehicle to “strike at 
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women,”29 and 
to provide injured plaintiffs a mechanism to establish “discrimination 
based on sex [that] create[s] a hostile or abusive work 
 
person harassed but could be anyone affected by the offensive conduct. [4] Unlawful 
sexual harassment may occur without economic injury to or discharge of the victim. 
[5] The harasser’s conduct must be unwelcome.  
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Facts About Sexual Harassment, http://www. 
eeoc.gov/facts/fs-sex.html (last visited May 8, 2007). The concept that Title VII prohibited a 
hostile working environment first surfaced in racial discrimination and national origin cases. 
See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that the phrase “terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment” in Title VII clearly protects against the practice of a 
working environment “heavily polluted” with racial discrimination such that it “destroy[s] 
completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers”). 
 26. In 1993 the EEOC issued Proposed Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, 
Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or Disability. The proposed guidelines seem to 
recognize that sexual harassment need not be of a sexual nature. See Hébert, supra note 3, at 
565. The 1993 Guidelines, however, were withdrawn in 1994. See Schultz, supra note 10, at 
1732 n.246.  
 27. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).  
 28. Id. In Meritor, a female plaintiff alleged that her supervisor continuously demanded 
sexual favors, fondled her in front of co-workers, had intercourse with her forty to fifty times, 
followed her into the women’s bathroom when she entered alone, exposed himself to her in the 
workplace, and even forcibly raped her. Id. at 60. Because the conduct alleged in Meritor was 
so egregious, one significant theoretical problem that emerged from its holding is that lower 
courts applying the standard interpret “severe and pervasive” to require allegations of sexual 
conduct. See infra notes 31–33. 
 29. Id. at 64 (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 
(1978)).  
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environment.”30 In acknowledging the EEOC Guidelines’31 definition 
of hostile work environment, the Meritor Court held, for the first 
time, that Title VII coverage is not limited to tangible employment 
actions, and that Title VII does prohibit sexually hostile work 
environments.32 In so holding, the Meritor Court decried that, in 
order for an alleged hostile work environment to rise to the level of 
sexual harassment, the abusive behavior must be sufficiently “severe 
or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and 
create an abusive working environment.’”33  
 
 30. Id. at 66.  
 31. The Court explained that the EEOC Guidelines supported the finding that economic 
injury is not a necessary requirement for a sexual harassment claim. See id. at 65 (citing 29 
C.F.R. 1604.11(a)(3) (1985); 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (Nov. 10, 1980) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1604)). In defining “sexual harassment,” the EEOC had described workplace conduct such as 
“unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct 
of a sexual nature.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985). The EEOC Guidelines provide an action for 
discrimination where “such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with 
an individual’s work performance, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working 
environment.” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)); see also Henson v. 
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (explaining that sexual harassment victims need 
not be threatened with termination or denial of advancement, but “a pattern of sexual 
harassment inflicted on an employee because of her sex” will be enough).  
 Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of 
one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial 
harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a 
gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make 
a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets. 
Henson, 682 F.2d at 902.  
 32. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. Prior to Meritor, the Court had only recognized quid pro quo 
harassment, in which a person of authority demands sexual favors of a subordinate as a 
condition of keeping a job or benefit, as forbidden by Title VII. See Roy, supra note 7, at 265. 
A discussion of the quid pro quo doctrine of sexual harassment is beyond the scope of this 
Note. For an in-depth analysis of direct and consequential economic loss in a sexually harassing 
workplace, see Aric G. Elsenheimer, Agency and Liability in Sexual Harassment Law: Toward 
a Broader Definition of Tangible Employment Actions, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1635 (2005). 
 33. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (alterations in original) (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904). In 
the years following Meritor, lower courts repeatedly fumbled in applying the “severe and 
pervasive” standard. Although Meritor listed elements for a hostile work environment, 
differences in interpretation arose among the circuits. See Maraist, supra note 22, at 1349 
(explaining that the “federal circuits divided on two issues: (1) from whose viewpoint the 
offensive conduct should be evaluated; and (2) the effect of the conduct on the plaintiff (or 
injury plaintiff suffered)”). Compare Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 
1986) (stating that the trier of fact “must adopt the perspective of a reasonable person’s reaction 
to a similar environment under essentially like or similar circumstances” and that the conduct 
must affect the psychological well being of a “reasonable person under like circumstances”), 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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2. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
In the 1989 case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,34 the Supreme 
Court recounted Ann Hopkins’ failed efforts to become partner at a 
prominent accounting firm.35 The Supreme Court determined that sex 
stereotyping motivated Price Waterhouse’s decision not to offer 
Hopkins a partnership in the firm.36 When informing Hopkins of the 
firm’s employment decision, one of the existing partners told her that 
in order to improve her candidacy, she should “walk more 
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-
up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”37 
Hopkins avoided dismissal of her claim of gender discrimination 
disparate treatment by showing that she suffered an adverse 
employment action because the discrimination culminated in failure 
to promote.38 However, one can speculate that Hopkins endured a 
 
disapproved of by 510 U.S. 17 (1993), with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(favoring a victim’s perspective over a reasonable person’s perspective and, for analysis of 
effects, a reasonable woman standard over a reasonable person standard).  
 34. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 
(1994).  
 35. Id. at 231–32. 
 36. Id. at 235–37. The Court paid particular attention to the district court’s findings that 
Price Waterhouse’s decision “stemmed from an impermissibly cabined view of the proper 
behavior of women” and that the company had “unlawfully discriminated against Hopkins on 
the basis of sex by consciously giving credence . . . to . . . sex stereotyping.” Id. at 236–37. 
 Also noted by the district court was that Hopkins had “played a key role in Price 
Waterhouse’s successful effort to win a multi-million dollar contract” that year, and “[n]one of 
the other partnership candidates . . . had a comparable record in terms of success[] . . . .” Id. at 
234 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted). “[P]artners in Hopkins’ office praised her 
character” and described her as “an outstanding professional” with “a strong character, 
independence and integrity.” Id. (citation omitted). Another high-ranking partner praised her 
“decisiveness” and “intellectual clarity.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 37. Id. at 235. “‘One partner described her as ‘macho;’ . . . [another] advised her to take ‘a 
course at charm school.’ Several partners criticized her use of profanity . . . only ‘because it’s a 
lady using foul language.’” Id. (citations omitted). The Court concluded that requiring a woman 
to fulfill sex-based stereotypes in order to obtain partnership, a position she would have 
procured based on ability and performance had she been male, constituted disparate treatment 
discrimination. Id. at 258. On remand, the district court ordered that Hopkins be made a partner 
in the firm. Price Waterhouse’s assertion that the partnership decision was not reflective of 
Hopkins’ gender was rejected. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1210 (D.D.C. 
1990), aff’d, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  
 38. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. “Disparate treatment generally concerns discrete 
employment decisions made because of sex or policies that disadvantage an employee or group 
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hostile work environment under Meritor’s severe and pervasive 
standard throughout her tenure with Price Waterhouse, although not 
sexual in nature.39 Price Waterhouse presented the Court and 
Hopkins an opportunity to apply the hostile work environment claim 
to sex stereotyping discrimination as “severe or pervasive” in its 
alteration of a “condition[] of employment” based on sex 
discrimination, but failed to do so.40  
3. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.  
In November 1993, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,41 the 
Supreme Court addressed the issue left open by the Meritor Court: 
whether a plaintiff alleging hostile work environment sexual 
harassment under Title VII must prove psychological injury in order 
to prevail.42 In Harris the Court attempted to create a less ambiguous 
framework for what constitutes a “hostile work environment.”43 
Petitioner Teresa Harris filed suit against her former employer 
alleging sexual discrimination under Title VII,44 claiming that on 
several occasions, she was the subject of both sexual harassment45 
and gender discrimination.46  
 
of employees based on their sex.” Henry L. Chambers, Jr., A Unifying Theory of Sex 
Discrimination, 34 GA. L. REV. 1591, 1591 (2000). “The employment decisions or judgments at 
issue in these cases are usually those that businesses must make in the normal course of 
business, such as hiring, firing, and promotion. Id.; see also UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 
499 U.S. 187 (1991) (describing Title VII disparate treatment claims as policies and actions 
resulting in differential treatment of men and women with respect to employment).  
 39. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the Meritor standard).  
 40. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).  
 41. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).  
 42. Id. at 20.  
 43. See Roppé, supra note 17, at 323. “‘Hostile work environment’ sexual harassment and 
‘abusive work environment’ sexual harassment are used interchangeably by the Supreme Court 
and are presumably synonymous terms.” Id. at 323 n.12 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 24–25 
(Scalia, J., concurring); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66).  
 44. Harris, 510 U.S. at 19–20.  
 45. Forklift’s president suggested that Harris accompany him to the Holiday Inn to 
negotiate a pay raise and implied on other occasions that it was likely that Harris had promised 
sex to clients in order to obtain their business. Id. at 19. Additionally, Forklift’s president 
demanded that Harris, as well as other female employees, retrieve coins from his pants pocket, 
pick up objects that he threw on the ground so that he could make suggestive comments as they 
bent over, and continuously commented on the sexual appearance of Harris and other women 
employees in their work attire. Id.  
 46. Forklift’s president stated to Harris on one occasion, while in the presence of several 
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The Harris Court echoed the decision in Meritor by defining a 
hostile work environment as one in which sexual harassment and 
discriminatory behavior creates an environment47 that a reasonable 
person would find abusive and hostile, and that the victim 
subjectively perceives as abusive.48 However, the Court did apply the 
standard set in Meritor to hold that the harassing conduct at issue 
need not dangerously affect the employee’s psychological well-
being49 in order to rise to the level of a hostile work environment.50 
 
other employees, “You’re a woman, what do you know” and that she was “a dumb ass woman.” 
Id.  
 47. “When the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and 
insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s 
employment and create an abusive working environment,’ Title VII is violated.” Id. at 21 
(quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).  
 48. The Harris Court adopted both subjective and objective standards to evaluate whether 
the alleged conduct at issue rose to the level of illegal sexual harassment. Harris, 510 U.S. at 
21–22. Under Harris’ analysis, a trial court must preliminarily decide whether a reasonable 
person would objectively be offended by the environment; secondly, it should assess whether 
the individual plaintiff found the situation offensive or harmful, regardless of a reasonable 
person’s judgment.  
 49. Legal commentators have repeatedly criticized this holding as ambiguous, drawing 
attention to the Court’s narrow framing of the issue as a means of sidestepping the controversial 
and difficult legal conflicts of the day. See Anne C. Levy, The United States Supreme Court 
Opinion in Harris v. Forklift Systems: “Full of Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing”, 43 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 275, 276 (1995). Even though the Court cast Harris as its opportunity to truly 
consider the definition of a hostile work environment, commentators aptly note that the Court 
failed to sufficiently address the central issue: the lower courts’ need for a practical, 
recognizable standard for analyzing claims of hostile work environment. Id. Critics contend that 
“Meritor left many open questions” and after Harris it appears that such “vague generalities . . . 
may never be clarified by the highest Court.” Id. at 316; see also Roppé, supra note 17, at 338 
(explaining that the standard purported in Harris is subject to several interpretations); Roy, 
supra note 7, at 78–79 (showing that despite Meritor and Harris, disagreement persists among 
the circuits as to what should be considered a hostile work environment). 
 In addition to criticizing the vagueness inherent in the Harris standard, legal commentators 
also criticize the decision’s analysis as narrowly focused on the sexual aspect of the facts. 
Specifically, the Harris Court tacitly adopted a disaggregation of the facts determined by the 
lower courts by considering only the alleged sexualized conduct as relevant to the hostile work 
environment claim. See Schultz, supra note 10, at 1711. “The disaggregation of sexual and 
nonsexual conduct [in sex discrimination claims] was not inevitable, for hostile work 
environment harassment emerged as a variant of disparate treatment.” Id. at 1714. Thus, “[t]he 
essence of a hostile work environment claim” stems from the concept that “the defendant is 
responsible [for] ma[king] the work environment more difficult for women (or men) because of 
their sex.” Id. In considering the two claims as factually divergent, Harris conveyed the concept 
to the lower courts that the types of harassing conduct are legally divergent as well. See Ruth 
Colker, Whores, Fags, Dumb-Ass Women, Surly Blacks, and Competent Heterosexual White 
Men: The Sexual and Racial Morality Underlying Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, 7 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 195, 208 (1995) (explaining that the magistrate in Harris overlooked non-sexual, 
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Based on its rejection of the “physiological harms standard” 
originally applied to Harris at the district court level, the Court 
reversed and remanded the case for a rehearing consistent with its 
newly delineated requirements.51 
4. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. 
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.52 the Court had 
the opportunity to reassess the elements of a hostile work 
environment. The Court in Oncale held that the sexually harassing 
hostile work environment includes any discriminatory action taken 
against a person “because of sex.”53 Yet, the court fell short of 
expounding how the standard applies to non-sexual facts.54  
In Oncale, the petitioner sought protection under Title VII for 
alleged same-sex harassment in the workplace.55 Oncale’s allegations 
consisted of incidents of sexual assault, threats of homosexual rape,56 
and other sex-related actions.57  
 
discriminatory comments that did not contribute to the abusive workplace in that they did not 
constitute “unwelcome” sexual conduct). 
 50. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. In applying the standard, the Harris Court applied a totality of 
the circumstances test to determine whether a workplace is sufficiently hostile or offensive. 
Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. The Court suggested factors in analyzing the circumstances of hostile 
work environment allegations such as: “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its 
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and 
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id.  
 51. Id. at 23. Interestingly, the Supreme Court was considering Harris at a time when 
sexual harassment claims were flooding the legal system. See Barry S. Roberts & Richard A. 
Mann, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Primer, 29 AKRON L. REV. 269, 272 (1996). 
Against that backdrop, one may glean that the Court was especially aware of the significance of 
the task before it: reconciliation of the indistinct and vague language of Title VII with the 
Court’s earlier decision in Meritor in order to provide the lower courts a standard by which to 
assess a discriminatory work environment. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia admits that 
the terms “abusive” and “hostile” do not seem to set a clear standard; nor does the addition of 
the word “objectively” appear to increase the standard’s clarity. Id. at 24 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). “As a practical matter, [this] holding lets virtually unguided juries decide whether 
sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is egregious enough . . . .” Id.  
 52. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).  
 53. Id. at 80–81; see Rebecca Hanner White, There’s Nothing Special About Sex: The 
Supreme Court Mainstreams Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725, 733 (1999) 
(“The question is not whether the harassment is sexual but whether it is being directed against 
this particular individual because of . . . sex.”). 
 54. White, supra note 53, at 734. 
 55. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 76.  
 56. Id. at 77. The Oncale opinion resolved the issue as to whether harassment in the 
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The Court acknowledged the ease in inferring discrimination in 
mainstream sexual harassment claims due to the fact that the alleged 
conduct “typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual 
activity.”58 Yet, the Court conceded that “harassing conduct need not 
be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of 
discrimination on the basis of sex.”59 Instead, when a “harasser is 
motivated by gender hostility to the presence of [a certain gender] in 
the workplace,” and the conduct at issue was not “tinged with 
offensive sexual connotations,” the action can still constitute 
discrimination because of sex.60  
D. Alternative Approaches 
Scholars have examined the social implications of treating sexual 
harassment differently from gender discrimination.61 Both 
“[i]ndividually and together, these scholars make powerful arguments 
 
workplace can violate Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination “because of sex” when the 
harasser and the harassed employee are of the same sex. The Court held unanimously that 
same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. Id. at 82.  
 The discussion of same-sex sexual harassment is beyond the scope of this Note. For a 
discussion of the effects of Oncale on the issue of same-sex workplace harassment, see Wendy 
M. Parr, Case Note, When Does Male-on-Male Horeseplay Become Discrimination Because of 
Sex?: Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Incorporated, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 87 (1999).  
 57. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77. In one instance, Oncale’s co-workers restrained him while 
another co-worker placed his penis on Oncale’s neck and arm. On a separate occasion, a co-
worker restrained Oncale while he was showering at work and pushed a bar of soap into 
Oncale’s anus. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118–19 (5th Cir. 
1996).  
 58. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 80–81.  
 61. What such scholars have asserted is the question of whether the human interactions at 
the core of sexualized harassment are different from the issues of human interactions involved 
in gender discrimination. Many believe that gender harassment differs from the issues of sexual 
harassment only in the choice of the weapon used, in that “both types . . . are motivated by the 
same purpose—to inform women of their role in the workforce—and have similar effects—to 
offend, humiliate, and embarrass.” Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 816 
(1991) (noting that the courts have severely limited the efficacy of the current cause of action 
for sexual harassment); see also Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the 
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1211 (1989) (focusing on 
“sexually oriented behavior” in the workplace, and arguing that “[i]f the defendant can 
demonstrate that the behavior in question was not likely to create a fear of sexual coercion or a 
sense of devaluative sexualization among women” then the court should not find the claim 
subject to Title VII).  
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about the failings of current sexual harassment doctrine and offer 
much [to be] consider[ed] in determining an alternative, gender-based 
theory of harassment.”62 
In her article, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Vicki 
Schultz explores what she names the prevailing “sexual desire-
dominance paradigm.”63 Schultz’s theory criticizes the hostile work 
environment doctrine as having evolved into a sexual model, and that 
“[t]o a large extent, the courts have restricted the conception of the 
hostile work environment harassment to . . . explicitly sexualized 
actions perceived to be driven by sexual designs.”64 
Furthermore, as Katherine M. Franke noted in her article, What’s 
Wrong with Sexual Harassment, “the link between sexual harassment 
and sex discrimination has been undertheorized by the Supreme 
Court.”65 Franke proposes “a reconceptualization of sexual 
harassment as gender harassment” in that “sexual harassment is a 
kind of sex discrimination not because the conduct . . . is sexual, and 
not because men do it to women, but . . . because it is a technology of 
sexism.”66 
 
 62. Linda B. Epstein, Note, What Is a Gender Norm and Why Should We Care? 
Implementing a New Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 161, 168 (1998).  
 63. Schultz, supra note 10, at 1692. The prevailing paradigm, as Schultz explains, 
wrongly defines unwanted sexual advances as the core of modern-day sexual harassment 
claims.  
 64. Id. at 1710. Schultz notes that much of the gender-based hostility and abuse women 
(and some men) endure at work is neither driven by the desire for sexual relations nor even 
sexual in conduct. See id.  
 65. Franke, supra note 9, at 691. Franke provides two explanations for the Court’s 
ambiguous theorizing of the hostile work environment. “First, the lack of an articulated 
theoretical link between sexual harassment and sex discrimination could reflect an avoidance 
technique: The Meritor Court was not prepared to embrace [the] theory of sexual harassment 
that conflated male sexuality with the subordination of women.” Id. at 692. Thus, the Court 
believed that “the sexual harassment of women by men reflects a kind of gendered power that 
Title VII is designed to address,” therefore the Court “avoid[ed] [the] difficult doctrinal 
question [of gender discrimination] while recognizing the sexism in sexual harassment.” Id. 
Second, Franke asserts that the Meritor Court possibly “believed that nothing more need be said 
about why sexual harassment is sex discrimination.” On the egregious facts in Meritor, “where 
a man is charged with sexually harassing a woman, and the conduct is severe or pervasive, 
unwelcome, and hostile to a reasonable person, the Court may have regarded the conduct as a 
kind of per se violation of Title VII.” Id.  
 66. Id. at 696. Sexual harassment merely  
perpetuates, enforces, and polices a set of gender norms that seek to feminize women 
and masculinize men. Sexual harassment perpetuates these norms because it takes 
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Moreover, legal commentators attribute this dilemma partially to 
the fact that the most publicized sexual harassment claims and 
controversies have been of the over-sexualized model.67 For example, 
the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas controversy was the first sexual 
harassment controversy to receive widespread public scrutiny.68 Even 
though the controversy did not wind its way through the courts, the 
situation did help to solidify the notion of sexual harassment 
stemming from sexual behavior.69 Hill, who at the time of the alleged 
behavior was a lawyer in her mid-twenties, claimed that Supreme 
Court nominee Clarence Thomas, her former supervisor at the EEOC, 
sexually harassed her.70 Hill accused Thomas of exposing her to 
“abrasive and vulgar language and repeatedly subject[ing her] to 
unwanted and unwarranted advances.”71  
Naturally, the sexual overtones in the Hill/Thomas controversy 
caused Hill’s allegations to become “one of the most media-saturated 
scandals ever played out in Washington.”72 The public, however, was 
not drawn to the tale of a victimized woman alleging power 
domination by her male superior in the workplace. Instead, what 
intrigued Americans was the fact that a Supreme Court nominee was 
accused of referring to his genitals as a character in a pornographic 
film—“Long Dong Silver”—in a conversation with his female 
subordinate,73 “and on another occasion, had remarked to her that 
someone had put a pubic hair on his can of Coke.”74  
 
place within a culture and history that in large part reduces women’s identity to that of 
a sex object, and reinforces men’s identity as that of a sexual aggressor. 
Id.  
 67. Vicki Schultz, Talking About Harassment, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 417, 418 (2001). 
 68. Schultz, supra note 10, at 1692.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1692–93. 
 71. Charles B. Adams, The Impact of Race on Sexual Harassment: The Disturbing 
Confirmation of Thomas/Hill, 2 HOW. SCROLL SOC. JUST. REV. 1, 7 (1993).  
 72. David Brock, The Media and Anita Hill, NAT’L REV., June 21, 1993, available at 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1282/is_n12_v45/ai_13952948. When the Anita 
Hill hearings opened on Friday, October 12, 1991, reporters were seen lingering outside the 
EEOC headquarters in downtown Washington, offering bribes to agency employees to leak 
inside information. Id.  
 73. Neil A. Lewis, Judge’s Backers Take Up His Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1991, at 
A28.  
 74. Id.  
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E. Circuit Example: The Hostile Work Environment in the Eighth 
Circuit  
Although legal scholars have continually commented on the 
discrepancy in the law as to the breadth of the sexual harassment 
hostile work environment and its failure to remedy sex-based 
harassment, the lower courts have failed to provide a legal outlet. 
Instead, circuits have continually held that plaintiffs alleging hostile 
work environment must assert sexual conduct in order to prevail. The 
following synopsis of hostile work environment claims considered by 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals from the years 2000 to 2005 
demonstrates this phenomenon.  
The 2005 case of Peterson v. Scott County75 involved allegations 
of sexual harassment by Peterson, a female correctional officer 
employed by the defendant county’s sheriff’s department.76 Peterson 
alleged that she was subjected to repeated comments from her 
immediate supervisor, such as “she ‘didn’t have the right parts’” to 
do certain job-related tasks, that it was “too hard to train . . . ladies,” 
and that “women were not needed . . . because they were lazy.”77 
However, given the fact that Peterson’s sexual harassment and 
discrimination claims were based primarily on gender-biased 
behaviors in the workplace, the Eighth Circuit found her claim 
insufficient to establish a hostile work environment.78 Quoting 
previous Supreme Court analysis, the Eighth Circuit found that “mere 
offensive utterance[s]” in the form of “abusive language” or “gender-
related jokes” did not amount to sexually discriminatory treatment.79 
Similarly, in 2003, the Eighth Circuit heard Alagna v. Smithville 
R-II,80 involving an action by a former school district employee 
against the school district, asserting hostile work environment sexual 
harassment by an emotionally troubled co-worker.81 Alagna’s fear of 
 
 75. Peterson v. Scott County, 406 F.3d 515 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 76. Id. at 519. 
 77. Id. at 519–20. 
 78. Id. at 523–24. 
 79. Id. at 524 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998)). 
 80. Alagna v. Smithville R-II, 324 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 81. Id. at 975. Frequently, the co-worker entered Alagna’s office to discuss “his failed 
relationships with other women, his relationship with his wife, and other intimate details of his 
personal life.” Id. at 977. He regularly waited for Alagna outside of her office, and he would 
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her co-worker’s conduct “led her to work with her door locked, stop 
eating in the cafeteria, avoid the hallways when possible, and carry 
pepper spray.”82 The Eighth Circuit, however, emphasized that 
Alagna’s co-worker “never discussed sexual activities . . . [and] never 
sexually propositioned her . . . .”83 In finding that the co-worker’s 
behavior was not “sufficiently severe or pervasive to satisfy the high 
threshold for actionable harm,” the Court noted that the “absence of 
any sexual advances on his part” was indicative that he was not a 
“sexual predator.”84 
On the contrary, in 2004 the Eighth Circuit decided Baker v. John 
Morrell & Co.,85 holding that a former employee of the defendant 
meat-packing plant had alleged facts sufficient for claiming hostile 
work environment sexual harassment.86 Here, Baker was subject to a 
co-worker “rub[bing] up against [her] . . . grabbing her, and pulling 
her into him.”87 Baker testified her co-worker “‘would say something 
or yell or make a comment and then he would take his hands and 
grind his groin area’ while he was right beside her.”88 
On her claim for hostile work environment, the court found this to 
be a sufficient claim due to the “pervasive sexual innuendo and 
repetitive offensive touching.”89 The court drew its conclusions for 
 
touch her arm and tell her that he “loved her” and that she was “very special.” Id. He also 
repeatedly telephoned Alagna at her home to discuss feelings of inadequacy and isolation; and 
on one occasion, placed “romance novels” in her mailbox in the faculty lounge. Id.  
 82. Id. at 978. 
 83. Id. at 977. Alagna was not the only target of this inappropriate conduct. Several 
female members of the faculty and student body reported that Yates also invaded their personal 
space and told them that he loved them. Id. at 979. Female students requested to have their 
classroom assignments changed to avoid interacting with him. Id.  
 84. Id. at 980. 
 85. Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 382 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 86. Id. at 829. 
 87. Id. at 820. The opinion states that another former employee of the defendant left 
because of sexual harassment, and she stated as the reason for her leaving the defendant’s 
position on the “frequent lewd behavior toward women.” Id. 
 88. Id. at 822. On one particular instance, “Eichmann intentionally rubbed up against 
Baker’s buttocks [and] . . . ‘had his arms out . . . with a big smile on his face.’” Id. at 825. Such 
repeated incidents caused Baker extreme anxiety. She visited with a psychiatrist who 
“diagnosed her with major depressive disorder, . . . post traumatic stress disorder and panic 
disorder.” Id. at 826. 
 89. Id. at 828. Here, the court cites several Eighth Circuit cases that found for the plaintiff 
on a hostile work environment claim given the sexuality of the offensive behavior. Id.; see 
Howard v. Burns Bros., 149 F.3d 835, 838 (8th Cir. 1998) (describing a co-employee constantly 
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the plaintiff based primarily on the fact that the “sexual nature of the 
harassment” was well known to the defendant.90  
Similarly, in the 2001 case of Beard v. Flying J, Inc.,91 the 
plaintiff alleged several acts of unwanted sexual contact by her 
immediate supervisor.92 Beard, employed as an assistant manager at 
the defendant restaurant, alleged that her supervisor sexually harassed 
her by means of “frequently brush[ing] his body against her breasts, 
[and] once rubbed a pair of cooking tongs across her breasts.” On 
another occasion he “pointed to his groin in her presence and in the 
presence of a male employee and stated that he would ‘show them 
some experience.’”93 Based on the sexually improper conduct, the 
court concluded that because Beard had been subject to occasions “in 
which her breasts had been touched,” that a “reasonable person could 
find that this was an environment sufficiently hostile to affect Ms. 
Beard’s working conditions.”94 Thus the plaintiff presented 
“sufficient evidence to create a submissible case of sex 
discrimination.”95 
II. ANALYSIS 
Courts are now faced with the task of deciphering the Supreme 
Court’s framework for determining what sexually harassing conduct 
constitutes a hostile work environment. The outcome relies heavily 
upon fact, yet the Supreme Court has failed to provide bright-line 
standards against which to assess whether repeated egregious conduct 
rises to the level of “severe or pervasive.” As a result, lower courts 
are forced to presume that conduct which is sexually harassing and 
conduct which is harassing because of sex are two disconnected 
judicial doctrines. The upshot of this phenomenon is that a woman 
who does not experience sexually explicit behavior in the workplace 
 
making sexual innuendos, brushing up against plaintiff, and telling lewd jokes with gestures). 
 90. Baker, 382 F.3d at 829. 
 91. Beard v. Flying J, Inc., 266 F.3d 792 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 92. Id. at 797. 
 93. Id. Five other female employees of defendant testified to having been subject to 
similar sexually inappropriate conduct. Id. 
 94. Id. at 798.  
 95. Id.  
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has great difficulty prevailing on a claim of non-sexualized sex 
harassment.96 As the doctrine has evolved, sexual conduct has 
become nearly an essential element in a claim for sexual harassment, 
not just one possible ingredient.97 By accentuating sexual abuse, 
however, the law leaves without remedy those suffering other 
prevalent forms of gender-based discrimination. 
A. Where the EEOC Went Wrong 
Since the legislative intent of Title VII clearly states that the 
EEOC should develop guidelines to help determine the scope of Title 
VII,98 courts generally look to the EEOC Guidelines to determine the 
standards for a viable sexual harassment claim.99 The EEOC’s focus 
on sexual harassment and silence with regard to discriminatory 
conduct based on gender indicates its policy to treat sexual 
harassment and gender harassment separately. Although offering 
specific guidelines for determining what constitutes sexual 
harassment, the agency offers no guiding principles for gender 
harassment (discrimination on the basis of sex). Other than the broad 
proscription that workplaces cannot discriminate in employment 
actions based on one’s gender,100 the EEOC gives very little guidance 
for its application. 
Consequently, the EEOC’s early interpretation of a sexually 
hostile work environment as “unwelcome sexual . . . conduct [that] 
unreasonably interfere[es] with an individual’s work performance or 
creat[es] an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working 
environment,”101 juxtaposed with its differentiation of “sexual 
 
 96. Schultz, supra note 10, at 1710. “To a large extent, the courts have restricted the 
conception of hostile work environment harassment to male-female sexual advances and other 
explicitly sexualized actions perceived to be driven by sexual designs.” Id.  
 97. See Colker, supra note 49, at 208–10.  
 98. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
 99. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 100. See generally PROGRAM MANUAL. The EEOC merely gives broad examples such as 
the illegality of labeling “men’s jobs” and “women’s jobs” as well as the refusal to hire an 
individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes. Furthermore, the EEOC material 
explains that state laws and regulations that discriminate on the basis of sex conflict and are 
superseded by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The guidelines do not define specific conduct or 
instances which give rise to actionable gender discrimination.  
 101. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2006).  
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harassment” within the concept of sex discrimination, sparked a 
number of district court cases to distinguish sexual harassment from 
non-sexual, gender-discriminatory conduct.102 These cases 
consistently take note of the EEOC Guidelines’ focus on the sexual 
aspects of sex discrimination as an “administrative interpretation of 
[Title VII] by the enforcing agency.”103 These opinions indicate that 
“‘while not controlling upon the courts by reasons of their authority, 
[the EEOC Guidelines] constitute a body of experience and informed 
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance.’”104 
B. Where the Supreme Court Went Wrong 
As noted above, in the seven-year period between 1986 and 1993 
the Supreme Court developed the modern sexual harassment 
doctrine.105 The birth of the hostile work environment concept in the 
Supreme Court’s first sexual harassment decision, Meritor, opened 
the door to sexual harassment claims falling short of tangible adverse 
employment actions.106 Just three years later, in Price Waterhouse, 
the Court evaluated alleged employment discrimination based on 
archaic gender stereotyping.107 There, however, sex-based 
 
 102. See Turley v. Union Carbide Corp., 618 F. Supp. 1438, 1442 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) 
(granting summary judgment for the defendant in a hostile work environment claim by a 
brought by female employee alleging that her employer harassed her by “picking on [her] all 
the time” and treating her less favorably than her male co-workers). Although not bound by the 
EEOC Guidelines, the Turley court determined that “the plaintiff was not subjected to 
harassment of a sexual nature” based on the EEOC Guidelines defining harassment as 
“unwelcome sexual advances . . . and other . . . conduct of a sexual nature.” Id. at 1441; see also 
Hosemann v. Technical Materials, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 659, 666–67 (D.R.I. 1982) (dismissing the 
plaintiff’s claim alleging discrimination because her co-workers were talking in a 
discriminatory manner about females, and her supervisors awarded her significantly less 
disability leave for an injury as compared with the leave granted to injured male employees; the 
court stated that she had not alleged sexual harassment as the term had come to be defined). 
 103. Levy, supra note 49, at 288. 
 104. Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)). 
 105. See supra Part I.C.  
 106. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Emerging from Meritor was a legal remedy 
for victims of aggressive sexual conduct in the workplace that, while not affecting a term or 
condition of employment, still warrants Title VII protection. See supra notes 27–33 and 
accompanying text.  
 107. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1988); see supra notes 34–37 and 
accompanying text. 
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discrimination resulted in the plaintiff’s failure to be promoted, and, 
thus, her claim was based on an adverse employment action 
warranting Title VII protection from disparate treatment.108 Based on 
the facts, however, one can assume that Hopkins was the victim of 
“severe and pervasive” conduct because of her sex throughout her 
tenure at Price Waterhouse. Yet, the presence of a deliberate adverse 
employment action on the basis of her sex made her claim ripe for 
analysis under the disparate impact doctrine.109  
Interestingly, Meritor and Price Waterhouse, two of the three 
significant Supreme Court cases dealing with Title VII sex 
discrimination, create an apparent disconnect between sexualized and 
non-sexualized conduct in the sexual harassment claim. The 
underlying difference in legal analysis between Meritor and Price 
Waterhouse was the presence of an adverse employment action in the 
latter because adverse employment actions bring disparate impact 
claims.110 Although the hostile work environment doctrine evolved 
with the very purpose of creating a remedy for victims of sex 
discrimination who did not suffer a tangible employment action,111 
the message sent by the decisions in these two cases is that there is a 
different remedy for victims of egregious sex-based conduct in the 
workplace and those who experience discrimination on account of 
their sex. 
In Harris, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider an 
alleged hostile work environment based on facts demonstrating both 
sexually explicit and non-sexually explicit sex discrimination.112 
Following the pattern of its recent analyses in Meritor and Price 
Waterhouse, the Harris Court disaggregated the claims based on 
sexual versus non-sexual conduct: claims of hostile work 
environment with respect to allegations involving behavior inherently 
sexual in nature and claims of disparate treatment for allegations 
based on sex.113 Clearly, Harris provided the Supreme Court the 
 
 108. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228; see supra note 38 and accompanying text.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239. 
 111. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64; see also supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993); see also supra notes 45–46 
and accompanying text.  
 113. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.  
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“opportunity to transcend this unduly restrictive focus [and] expand 
the concept of hostile work environment harassment to include all 
conduct that is rooted in gender-based expectations about work roles 
. . . .”114 Instead, what resulted is a Supreme Court failure to perceive 
the correlation between a sexualized hostile work environment and a 
sex-discriminatory hostile work environment.115 
This disconnect begs the question: If a sex disparate treatment 
claim requires an adverse, tangible employment action, and the 
hostile work environment claim need not allege tangible employment 
actions, yet requires sexual conduct as the underlying element, then 
what is the judicial remedy for an employee who does not experience 
a direct adverse employment action, yet labors in a workplace 
severely hostile and abusive to her because of her sex?  
III. PROPOSAL 
Whether a workplace is polluted with sexually based egregious 
and abusive harassment, gender-based aggression, or a combination 
of the two, the central issue under Title VII is whether an individual 
has been subjected to an abusive workplace indicative of sex 
discrimination. However, the employee suffering discrimination as a 
result of behavior intended to protect male hierarchy in the workplace 
faces an uphill battle for Title VII relief. This dichotomy is the result 
of the Supreme Court’s creation of ambiguity for the lower courts in 
interpreting the breadth of the judicially created hostile work 
environment claim, juxtaposed with the EEOC’s definition of the 
hostile work environment as blatantly sexual in nature. Together, 
these phenomena have left claims for abusive gender discrimination 
without a legal remedy.  
The legislative intent of Title VII—to outlaw sex discrimination in 
employment—provides that an employee’s compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment116 must not be provided in a 
sexually discriminatory manner. Title VII’s vision demands the 
creation of a hostile work environment cause of action encompassing 
 
 114. See Schultz, supra note 10, at 1712.  
 115. See id. at 1712–13. 
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000); see also supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.  
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gender-motivated conduct that constructively alters an employee’s 
terms of employment.117  
The evolution of the sex discrimination claim, however, reveals an 
apparent disconnect between judicial interpretation and the legislative 
intent of Title VII. It is undeniable that when a supervisor or co-
worker makes unwelcome sexual advances toward a member of the 
workplace, such action constitutes unlawful sexual harassment. 
However, where a woman experiences a workplace with a set of 
norms manifested by hostile and offensive, yet not sexually 
demeaning, behavior because of her gender, she should not be denied 
Title VII protection. To do so fails to recognize that the very purpose 
of Title VII is to protect her from such conduct.  
It is socially injurious to leave the status of the hostile work 
environment doctrine in this under-inclusive state. Ideally, the 
Supreme Court could remedy this issue with a re-analysis of the 
hostile work environment to better clarify that “severe and pervasive” 
conduct results not only from discrimination that is sexual, but 
equally from discrimination because of sex.118 Yet, in view of the 
realities of judicial economy, it is doubtful that the Court will 
consider another hostile work environment claim in the near future.  
Perhaps cognizant of the limitations of the judicial process, 
Congress charged the EEOC as the administrative body accountable 
for enforcing Title VII in America’s workplaces.119 Although courts 
are not bound by the EEOC Guidelines, vagueness in the judicial 
evolution of the hostile work environment claim has resulted in 
courts relying on the EEOC to provide a strong frame of reference.  
However, where the EEOC provides employers, employees, and 
courts with a comprehensive definition of a sexual harassment claim 
 
 117. See Chambers, supra note 38, at 1642 (stating that “disparate treatment, quid pro quo, 
and hostile work environment were once distinct causes of action that shared some 
resemblance,” and they should still be considered variations on the same theme).  
 118. Note that the Court’s majority “opinion in Oncale, iterating that same-sex harassment 
is sex discrimination if it occurs because of sex, fails to resolve it.” Epstein, supra note 62, at 
162. “If we could answer th[is] question definitively, we would go far toward implementing the 
vision of Title VII . . . .” Id. Unquestionably, the allegations in Oncale were sexually aggressive 
in nature, which only further attached the notion of sexual conduct to the hostile work 
environment despite the Court’s acknowledgement that harassing conduct does not have to be 
sexual in nature. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.  
 119. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
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in the hostile work environment context, the EEOC merely 
acknowledges the existence of a Title VII claim for “discrimination 
because of sex.”120 In failing to define or characterize conduct that 
falls under the paradigm, the EEOC provides no guidance as to its 
application.  
It is imperative that the EEOC regulations mirror the legislative 
intent of Title VII. Therefore, the EEOC should recognize the under-
inclusive state of workplace sex discrimination law and refine its 
Guidelines in response. Thus, the Guidelines should read: 
Title VII’s prohibition of employment discrimination on the 
basis of sex includes: (1) sexual harassment in the form of 
unwelcome sexual conduct that unreasonably interferes with 
an individual’s work performance or creates an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive work environment; or (2) sexual 
discrimination in the form of abusive verbal conduct or 
employment actions that negatively effect working conditions 
and create a hostile and offensive work environment on the 
basis of gender.  
Furthermore, the Guidelines defining hostile work environment 
should reflect such and be refined to read:  
A hostile work environment claim is brought when 
discriminatory conduct as defined in either parts (1) or (2) (or 
both) of § 1604.11 interferes with an individual’s work 
performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
work environment falling short of an adverse employment 
action.  
As the administrative body empowered to act, it is imperative that 
the EEOC carry out the intent of Title VII with a close inspection of 
the legislative mandate. The statute clearly dictates the purpose to 
defend “sex” as a protected class in the workplace and to guard 
against employment actions offensive and adverse to that mission.  
 
 120. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (2006); see supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text for the 
current definition of sexual harassment in the EEOC Guidelines. 
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CONCLUSION 
By ignoring the disconnect illustrated above, and rationalizing 
sexual harassment based on societal views of sexuality, courts and 
the EEOC are ignoring Title VII’s mandate that employers provide a 
workplace free from offensive behavior.121 Title VII is the legislative 
symbol of the struggle for equal employment opportunities for 
females in the workplace, not merely a legislative design to magically 
abolish the sexual mores wedged into our society.  
According to the current state of the law, men should keep their 
hands off of women in the workplace, refrain from sexual comments 
or expressions, and any attempt at sexual relations between co-
workers or subordinates should be deemed inappropriately hostile. 
“Workplace sexual conduct may injure women because it objectifies 
them as sexual objects” and “assumes that all men conform to and 
join into a kind of sexualized . . . masculine culture.”122 Yet, the over-
determination of the hostile work environment claim as a legal 
recourse for workplace sexual desires essentially misstates the 
“wrong” of sexual harassment. Far more detrimental is the fact that it 
trivializes the nature of the harm at issue in sex discrimination cases 
generally.  
Such interpretation of the hostile work environment is therefore 
harmful to anti-gender discrimination laws, and must be carefully 
scrutinized for consistency with the recognized purpose of Title VII, 
rather than hastily interpreted as a basis on which to regulate the 
discomforts of sex in the workplace. 
 
 121. Roy, supra note 7, at 278.  
 122. Franke, supra note 9, at 759.  
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